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COMMUNITY 
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ABSTRACT 
Despite decades of unmitigated administrative success, the Alaska Permanent 
Fund Dividend (PFD) is not immune from political and legal controversy. 
The symbolic and financial importance that Alaskans ascribe to their annual 
dividend checks has generated disputes between ordinary residents and 
executive agencies over eligibility. Litigation concerning three dominant 
status requirements—minimum residency, U.S. citizenship, and felony 
incarceration—reveal not only the extent to which Alaskans will pursue what 
they believe to be valid claims on their share of natural resource wealth, but 
also the limits of full political membership in the state. This Comment frames 
a sample of the Alaska Supreme Court’s decisions on PFD eligibility in terms 
of membership in Alaska’s political community. The PFD reflects the Alaska 
Legislature’s opinion about valid beneficiaries from oil revenues, and the state 
courts police eligibility at the margin. This Comment therefore argues that the 
Alaska Supreme Court implicitly determines, on the basis of statutory intent 
and administrative rule interpretations, “insiders” and “outsiders” within 
the state’s political community.  
INTRODUCTION 
Alaskans are separated from their fellow Americans not only by an 
expanse of British Columbia but also by their enlistment in one of the 
most generous social welfare programs in the country. Since its 
inception, Alaskans have received on average $1,100 per year between 
1982 and 2010 from the Permanent Fund Dividend (PFD).1 Our 
 
* Visiting Assistant Professor, Duke University School of Law; Yale Law School, 
J.D. 2010; University of Oxford, MPhil 2004; Georgetown University, B.S. 2002. 
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 1.  See Permanent Fund Dividend Division Applications and Payments, ALASKA 
DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE PERMANENT FUND DIVISION, 
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understanding of the PFD’s long-term economic consequences remains 
spare, but reliable anecdotal evidence suggests that many of the state’s 
residents are well aware of their annual benefits.2 Alaskans await their 
dividend payments before making important household purchases, and 
businesses engage in observable price competition for a larger share of 
consumer spending with dividend funds.3 
But the PFD’s import is not limited to the extra dollars and cents 
that accrue to qualified Alaskans each year. A fairly robust conversation 
conducted by political philosophers and economists about the future of 
liberal-progressive economic programs surrounds the PFD.4 Indeed, 
political economists analyzing asset-based welfare systems5 have long 
shown interest in the PFD, especially as a blueprint for similar initiatives 
in other parts of the world.6 Because the program’s administration is 
relatively straightforward and uncontroversial, however, legal 
scholarship includes relatively little discussion of the PFD.7 This 
underrepresentation among legal academics and practitioners is both 
lamentable and ripe for correction given recent debates about the 
privileges of state residency and national citizenship.8 
 
http://www.pfd.state.ak.us/appsandpaymnts/ (last visited Dec. 28, 2011). 
 2.  See DAVE ROSE, SAVING FOR THE FUTURE: MY LIFE AND THE ALASKA 
PERMANENT FUND 157 (Kent Sturgis 2008) (“Some recipients blow the windfall on 
vacations or expensive toys. Others save it for education. Many pay off medical 
bills or otherwise reduce their debt. . . . In rural Alaska, however, the dividend 
can make a major difference, providing an essential shot of cash to keep 
subsistence hunters stocked with ammo and spare parts.”). 
 3.  SCOTT GOLDSMITH, THE ALASKA PERMANENT FUND DIVIDEND: A CASE 
STUDY IN IMPLEMENTATION OF A BASIC INCOME GUARANTEE 9–10 (July 2, 2010) 
(unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.iser.uaa.alaska.edu/ 
Publications/bien_xiii_ak_pfd_lessons.pdf. 
 4.  See, e.g., Jonathan Anderson, The Alaska Permanent Fund: Politics and 
Trust, PUB. BUDGETING & FIN., Summer 2002, at 57; J. Patrick O’Brien & Dennis O. 
Olson, The Alaska Permanent Fund and Dividend Distribution Program, 18 PUB. FIN. 
Q. 139 (1990). 
 5.  For a discussion on asset-based welfare programs in the United 
Kingdom, where the phrase originated, see Will Paxton, Progressive Asset-Based 
Welfare, in EQUAL SHARES?: BUILDING A PROGRESSIVE AND COHERENT ASSET-BASED 
WELFARE POLICY (Will Paxton ed., 2003). 
 6.  See, e.g., EXPORTING THE ALASKA MODEL: ADAPTING THE PERMANENT FUND 
DIVIDEND FOR REFORM AROUND THE WORLD (Karl Widerquist & Michael Howard 
eds., forthcoming 2012). 
 7.  But see Laurence A. Smith, Note, A Proposed Solution to the Federal 
Taxation of Alaska Permanent Fund Dividend Payments, 11 ALASKA L. REV. 97 (1994) 
(arguing for a repurposing of dividend payments as rebates for personal fuel 
outlays to avoid federal income taxation). 
 8.  Texas Governor Rick Perry, for example, withstood significant criticism 
during the 2011 Republican presidential debates for suggesting that the children 
of illegal immigrants should be allowed to attend state universities at the lower 
in-state tuition rate. See Ross Ramsey, On Immigrant Tuition, Texans See It Perry’s 
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This Comment connects the PFD’s economic salience to broader 
points about the relationship between law and membership in a political 
community. On its face, the PFD’s enacting legislation simply confers 
monetary benefits on a well-defined portion of Alaska’s population. 
Dividend payments carry no strings; they are disbursed on a means-
independent basis, and the state takes no stance on how residents spend 
the money. Thus, the program is almost completely universal in 
coverage and neutral with respect to use. Probing a bit more deeply, 
though, we should understand the PFD both as the United States’ most 
significant experiment with a universal asset policy and as a signifier of 
full participation in the state polity. Evidence for the latter appears in 
several judicial decisions demarcating the often-shifting boundary 
between eligible and non-eligible recipients. Resolving these disputes 
may have a negligible effect on overall PFD outlays, but the answers 
provided partially suggest who “counts” as full members of the state’s 
political community. To that extent, what might appear as marginal 
choices about membership in this community might actually say a great 
deal about its fundamental norms and values. 
This Comment is organized as follows. Part I briefly explains the 
PFD’s history, structure, and performance. Part II reviews state court 
decisions on three barriers to receiving dividend payments: the 
minimum residency requirement, American citizenship, and felony 
incarceration. In all three cases, the Alaska Supreme Court has declined 
to recognize constitutional and statutory violations for failure to receive 
dividend payments when the plaintiff does not meet the status 
requirement. Part III considers the extent to which these judicial 
opinions reveal a broader understanding of who the state considers full 
participants in the political community. On this reading, receipt of 
dividends does not necessarily signify an individual’s direct 
participation in political decision-making. Rather, this Comment argues 
that it entrenches a notion that political citizenship “runs with the land.” 
Only those who legally call Alaska territory home for a sufficient period 
of time will reap the abundant benefits from the ground beneath their 
feet. 
 
 
 
 
Way, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 2, 2011, at A23. 
GRIFFIN.V24 (DO NOT DELETE) 4/16/2012  6:27 PM 
82 ALASKA LAW REVIEW VOL. 29:1 
I. A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF THE PFD 
The PFD sprung to life in 1980 through legislation spearheaded by 
Governor Jay Hammond. An institution known as the Alaska 
Permanent Fund (APF) was created in the preceding decade, but the 
APF had no overarching purpose.9 It was partially a state-run 
investment vehicle and partially a source of capital funds for large-scale 
development projects.10 Hammond’s intervention was indispensable for 
reorienting the Fund toward its current trajectory. A protracted debate 
between those who one insider called “loan crazies”—stakeholders 
pushing for applying APF monies toward significant capital 
development—and the arguably more prudent preferences of Governor 
Hammond played out in the last three years of the 1970s and effectively 
ended with the 1980 legislative session.11 
Governor Hammond’s personal philosophy regarding the proper 
use of the state’s bounty ultimately carried the day. As a self-described 
political outsider, Hammond remained skeptical of concentrating wealth 
in the government’s hands.12 Believing that “the money could be used 
better by individuals than spent on government programs or invested in 
development projects,” the bill he shepherded set the first dividend 
payment at fifty dollars and conferred on each adult one dividend per 
year of residency since 1959.13 The final codified version, which controls 
dividend payments to the present day, stipulates that: 1) potential 
recipients apply to the Department of Revenue; 2) be state residents on 
the date of application and during the qualifying year; 3) be physically 
present in the state for at least seventy-two consecutive hours during the 
two years preceding the current dividend year; and 4) meet certain 
qualifications pertaining to immigration status.14 The statute also spells 
out further restrictions on the residency requirement.15 The amount of 
the dividend each year depends on a complex statutory formula but one 
that has led to reasonably predictable annual payments.16 
The Alaska Constitution explicitly commands the prudent use of 
 
 9.  See ROSE, supra note 2, at 185. 
 10.  See id. 
 11.  See id. at 151. 
 12.  Id. at 158. 
 13.  Id. at 158–59. 
 14.  ALASKA STAT. § 43.23.005(a) (2010). 
 15.  Id. § 43.23.008 (setting out the conditions under which yearly absences 
may not exceed 180, 120, or 45 days depending on the nature of those absences). 
 16.  Id. § 43.23.025. Although the dividend amount depends on the formula 
in this section, the outcome invariably will fluctuate since the formula inputs 
include the number of eligible residents and accounting for underpayments that 
accrued in previous years. See id. 
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the state’s natural resources for the general welfare of its residents.17 
Article VIII, Section 2 of the Alaska Constitution requires the legislature 
to utilize, develop, and conserve the state’s natural resources “for the 
maximum benefit of its people.”18 Moreover, the 1976 amendments to 
the Alaska Constitution formally enshrined the new APF.19 By nearly all 
accounts, the PFD has been a success and followed through on the 
constitutional promise to use Alaska’s natural resources for the greater 
good: 
[In 2011,] [t]he Permanent Fund had an outstanding fiscal year, 
returning just over 20 percent and ending slightly above $40 
billion. This is the first time the Fund’s year-end value has 
closed at over $40 billion and only the third time the returns 
have broken the 20 percent threshold. . . .  
  . . . . 
  . . . Since the Fund was created 35 years ago by Alaska 
voters, it has paid out $19.2 billion in dividends, more than the 
$15.6 billion in mineral revenues and other deposits it has taken 
in, and was still worth $40.1 billion on June 30.  
  Another way to measure success is the recognition that the 
Permanent Fund has received from its peers and outside 
groups. A few years ago, the Peterson Institute ranked the 
Alaska Permanent Fund as the most transparent of all of the 
sovereign wealth funds . . . . When the International Monetary 
Fund led the discussion with other sovereign wealth funds to 
draft the Santiago Principles for transparent governance, much 
of the document was based on the Alaska Permanent Fund 
Corporation’s current practices.20 
Much of this success has been tied to the creation of the Permanent 
Fund Corporation (PFC), also launched in 1980,21 which has contributed 
significant additional transfers to the Fund. The PFC serves as the 
 
 17.  See ALASKA CONST. art. VIII, § 2. 
 18.  Id. 
 19.  Id. art. IX, § 15 (“At least twenty-five percent of all mineral lease rentals, 
royalties, royalty sale proceeds, federal mineral revenue sharing payments and 
bonuses received by the State shall be placed in a permanent fund, the principal 
of which shall be used only for those income-producing investments specifically 
designated by law as eligible for permanent fund investments. All income from 
the permanent fund shall be deposited in the general fund unless otherwise 
provided by law.”). 
 20.  ALASKA PERMANENT FUND CORP., YESTERDAY, TODAY & TOMORROW: 2011 
ANNUAL REPORT 3 (2011), available at http://www.apfc.org/ 
_amiReportsArchive/APFC%20Annual%20Report%202011.pdf; see also 
Anderson, supra note 4, at 60–63 (documenting the evolution of the PFD). 
 21.  ALASKA PERMANENT FUND CORP., supra note 20, at 25. 
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investment strategist for the Fund and may only invest revenues in 
income-producing vehicles according to the prudent investor rule.22 The 
most significant tension exists, then, not with the structure or 
management of the APF but with the divide between residents’ 
interpretations about valid claims under the PFD statute and those of 
the centralized administration under the Department of Revenue. These 
disputes have been resolved, usually in favor of the state government, 
through a series of court rulings dating back to the 1990s. It is those 
cases that this Comment argues help shape the contours of state 
citizenship. 
II. JUDICIAL DETERMINATIONS OF PFD ELIGIBILITY 
Although most of the disputes finding their way onto the state 
court docket concern the minimum residency requirement, the specific 
legal issues within that category span a variety of circumstances.23 
Moreover, before the Alaska Legislature formally amended the PFD 
statute to exclude illegal aliens and certain incarcerated prisoners, 
complaints often surfaced to challenge denial of dividend payments on 
these grounds. The following sections review noteworthy court rulings 
about eligibility for clues into how the judiciary polices the boundary 
between full and partial participants in the state polity. 
A.  Residency Requirements 
Perhaps the easier cases involve bona fide Alaska residents who fail 
to satisfy the statutory minimum for days spent in the state.24 A leading 
example arose in Church v. State, where the plaintiff claimed equal 
protection and substantive due process violations for failure to receive 
 
 22.  For an overview of the PFC’s investment guidelines, see ALASKA 
PERMANENT FUND CORP., AN ALASKAN’S GUIDE TO THE PERMANENT FUND 14–23 
(2009), available at http://www.apfc.org/home/Media/publications/ 
2009AlaskansGuide.pdf. For a discussion of the prudent investor rule, see John 
H. Langbein, The Uniform Prudent Investor Act and the Future of Trust Investing, 81 
IOWA L. REV. 641, 645–54 (1996). 
 23.  See, e.g., Eagle v. State, 153 P.3d 976, 977 (Alaska 2007) (rejecting 
plaintiff’s argument that a federal law pertaining to the civil rights of 
servicepersons preempted Alaskan law); State v. Gazaway, 793 P.2d 1025, 1025 
(Alaska 1990) (holding that children’s absence was not temporary under the PFD 
statute and upholding denial of dividend payments). 
 24.  See, e.g., Schikora v. State, 7 P.3d 938, 942 (Alaska 2000) (plaintiff 
claiming PFD despite exceeding the statutory absence requirement in part 
because he had lived in Alaska since 1945); Underwood v. State, 881 P.2d 322, 
324 (Alaska 1994) (plaintiff claiming that he would not have moved from Texas 
to Alaska as early as he did but for the dividend payment). 
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his 1993 payment.25 Patrick Church was present in the state for only 91 
days, well short of the 185-day minimum required under the PFD 
statute. The reason seemed facially legitimate: to care for his ailing 
mother who lived in another jurisdiction.26 Because of this exigency, 
Church contended that any bright line cutoff (e.g., the 180-day 
maximum absence) was unreasonable and unconstitutional.27 More 
specifically, under his reading the administrative rules accompanying 
the PFD statute remove necessary flexibility and discretion beyond cases 
enumerated in the regulations.28 
The court summarily dismissed Church’s attack using its precedent 
in Brodigan v. Alaska Department of Revenue.29 The issue in Brodigan was 
even closer than that in Church. The married couple whose dividend 
applications had been rejected spent the fall and winter months in the 
lower forty-eight states because of John Brodigan’s vascular health 
issues.30 On the advice of physicians, the Brodigans believed that 
avoiding the much colder Alaska climate during these seasons was in 
John’s best interest.31 The Department of Revenue’s regulations 
unsurprisingly included a medical exemption to the residency 
requirement.32 However, the Department disagreed that seasonal 
residency changes fell within the medical exemption, and the court 
accepted that interpretation.33 What ultimately mattered was the 
relationship between the directives of qualified physicians and the intent 
to reside in Alaska.34 Thus, in Church the Alaska Supreme Court also 
deferred to the Department’s judgment that Alaskans must reside in the 
state for at least half the year since “the purpose of [the statutory 
residency requirement] is to ensure that PFDs are only given to 
 
 25.  973 P.2d 1125, 1127 (Alaska 1999). 
 26.  Id. At the time the Alaska Supreme Court decided Church the original 
PFD statute had been amended precisely to exempt absences for medical leave. 
Id. at 1127 n.1. 
 27.  Id. at 1128. 
 28.  Id. 
 29.  900 P.2d 728 (Alaska 1995). 
 30.  Id. at 729–30. 
 31.  Id. at 729. 
 32.  That regulation now appears formally in the PFD statute. ALASKA STAT. 
§ 43.23.008(a)(5) (2010) (“[A]n otherwise eligible individual who is absent from 
the state during the qualifying year remains eligible for a current year 
permanent fund dividend if the individual was absent . . . receiving continuous 
medical treatment recommended by a licensed physician or convalescing as 
recommended by the physician who treated the illness if the treatment or 
convalescence is not based on a need for climatic change.”). This language seems 
to have been inserted specifically with the Brodigans’ case in mind. 
 33.  Brodigan, 900 P.2d at 731. 
 34.  Id. 
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permanent residents and a legitimate function of corresponding 
regulations is to ease the administrative burdens of determining 
eligibility.”35 
As a comparison, many other laws—the Family and Medical Leave 
Act (FMLA) of 199336 in particular—impose their own attachment 
mandates, i.e., threshold levels of continuous connection with or service 
for an entity granting statutory benefits.37 For example, simply working 
for an employer with at least fifty employees at the time one seeks 
FMLA benefits does not suffice. The petitioning employee must have 
worked for her employer for at least 12 months prior to the leave period 
and for 1,250 hours during the most recent 12 months.38 Just as with the 
PFD residency requirement, employees have litigated numerous cases 
challenging their status as covered individuals under the FMLA.39 In 
these courtroom jousts over eligibility, one observes a unique exchange 
between citizens and courts regarding legislative prerogatives and what 
benefits constitute the core of citizenship. 
B.  Immigration Status 
In addition to direct statutory language on the requisite number of 
days one must reside in the state, the Alaska Legislature authorized the 
Commissioner of the Department of Revenue to promulgate 
supplementary regulations about minimum U.S. citizenship 
requirements. The most important case decided on immigration status 
occurred before the PFD statute was amended explicitly to exclude 
illegal aliens. In State v. Cosio, the Alaska Supreme Court upheld the 
Commissioner’s reading of the original statute’s intention-based 
 
 35.  Church v. State, 973 P.2d 1125, 1129 (Alaska 1999) (emphasis added). 
 36.  Pub. L. No. 103-3, 107 Stat. 6 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601–
2654 (2012)). 
 37.  The Author has argued elsewhere that family and medical leave laws, 
both state and federal, reflect judgments about the universal affirmative rights 
that should accrue to all covered by the relevant legislature. Christopher L. 
Griffin, Jr., Medical Leave-Taking After the FMLA: An Empirical Analysis of 
Affirmative Employment Rights 13–16 (Nov. 22, 2011) (unpublished 
manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1974572. 
 38.  29 U.S.C. § 2611(2)(A) (2012). 
 39.  See, e.g., Pirant v. U.S. Postal Serv., 542 F.3d 202 (7th Cir. 2008) (rejecting 
plaintiff’s argument that she should be “entitled to credit for the three to five 
minutes she spent each workday putting on and removing her gloves, shoes, 
and work shirt” toward the necessary 1250 hours under the FMLA); Engelhardt 
v. S.P. Richards Co., 472 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2006) (denying FMLA coverage to an 
employee claiming that her employer included two integrated companies, which 
would have met the statutory minimum of fifty employees within seventy-five 
miles). 
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language.40 Specifically, the law at the time of Cosio merely defined 
“‘state resident’ as ‘an individual who is physically present in the state 
with the intent to remain indefinitely in the state.’”41 Arturo and Tomas 
Cosio lived in the United States illegally but averred that “they were 
physically present in Alaska and intended to remain.”42 At issue were 
payments received in 1985 and 1986 and denied in 1987, the period 
during which the Cosios lived in Alaska.43 The Department stood firm 
against sending the final dividend and demanded the remitter of the 
previous two dividends.44 Its legal basis was a regulation under which 
“[a]n alien with resident alien status . . . is eligible to receive a permanent 
fund dividend.”45 
The Alaska Supreme Court, in another nod to the presumed 
superior authority and expertise of administrative agencies, focused as it 
did with the Church case on the relevancy of permanent residency.46 In 
other words, it is no coincidence that the Permanent Fund Dividend has 
been understood as properly accruing to individuals living continuously 
and legally within the state’s borders. The PFD statute and associated 
regulations undoubtedly must, as a matter of fundamental fairness, 
reflect line-drawing exercises that distinguish valid residents from 
others free-riding on the beneficence of the state. Whether the courts 
should have deferred less to agency discretion when effectuating that 
goal, for example by taking subjective intent to self-identify as an 
Alaskan into account, is a question this Comment does not take up. But 
the answer to it certainly underscores the importance of the likelihood 
that someone will live in Alaska permanently and legally before 
receiving dividend payments. 
C.  Incarcerated Felons 
Alaskans who have been convicted of felonies and reside in prison 
are legally excluded from receiving PFD payments. In response, some 
prisoners have lodged complaints that the PFD statute and agency rules 
violate both the U.S. and Alaska Constitution’s Equal Protection 
 
 40.  858 P.2d 621 (Alaska 1993). For a case uncomplicated by statutory 
amendment in the immigration context, see State v. Andrade, 23 P.3d 58 (Alaska 
2001). 
 41.  Cosio, 858 P.2d at 623 (quoting ALASKA STAT. § 43.23.095(7) (2010)). 
 42.  Id. 
 43.  Id. 
 44.  Id. 
 45.  Id. (quoting ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 15, § 23.615(d) (1988) (repealed 
1989)) (emphasis added). 
 46.  Id. at 627. 
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Clauses. In the first major case to reach the Alaska Supreme Court, State 
v. Anthony, the court denied that exacting levels of scrutiny applied to 
the purely economic interest represented by the PFD and held that the 
legislature had acted reasonably in denying PFDs to incarcerated 
felons.47 At the heart of the equal protection claim was the 
reasonableness of treating the incarcerated differently than persons who 
may have committed similar crimes but for some stroke of luck are not 
behind bars. 
The Anthony court sided with the state, especially its assertion that 
the purpose of excluding prisoners from PFD payments was “to 
compensate the state partially for the cost of incarcerating felons.”48 In 
addition to accepting the reimbursement justification for withholding 
PFD payments, the court also recognized restitution as a valid purpose.49 
No doubt swayed by prudential considerations, the court artfully 
disentangled—and destroyed—the equal protection claim: 
It is possible that a felon may have his dividend taken by the 
state even though he has already paid restitution to his 
victim. . . . There are, however, at least two reasons why 
individual restitution orders may be inadequate: (1) a felon 
who owes a victim restitution might not even apply for a 
permanent fund dividend since he or she will not benefit from 
it; and (2) since many felons do not have the means to pay 
restitution, victims must depend on the crime victim’s 
compensation fund. . . . [E]qual protection does not require 
perfection. We are persuaded that those felons who are 
sentenced to serve time in prison are more likely than those 
who are not sentenced to incarceration to have seriously 
harmed others.50 
Thus, the court decided the legislature’s judgment that incarcerated 
felons do not deserve PFD payments corresponded to an equally 
legitimate assumption that an incarcerated felon has committed a more 
blameworthy crime.  By exceeding the scope of the prison maintenance 
cost-saving rationale, the Anthony ruling manifests the state judiciary’s 
view about the relative position of the imprisoned in the political 
community. Simply stated, that position is inferior. 
Other constitutional arguments that incarcerated felons have 
adopted, albeit unsuccessfully, allege that denying dividend benefits 
amounts to an ex post facto punishment or violation of double jeopardy 
 
 47.  810 P.2d 155 (Alaska 1991). 
 48.  Id. at 159. 
 49.  Id. at 161. 
 50.  Id. (footnotes omitted). 
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protections.51 Because the Commissioner’s decision to withhold 
payment does not itself follow from a criminal statute, the Alaska 
Supreme Court found one inmate’s ex post facto complaint to be 
without merit.52 The same conclusion led the court to reject his double 
jeopardy claim since the denial of PFD resources was not a separate 
punishment from the plaintiff’s forty-year murder sentence.53 
The equal protection jurisprudence is the weakest that the Alaska 
Supreme Court has proffered in the PFD context to uphold the 
Department of Revenue’s payment denials. In lieu of outright forfeiture, 
incarcerated felons could have their dividends held in trust, just as the 
oil revenue source is held in trust by the state, until their release. 
Moreover, the court’s answer to the arbitrariness of withholding PFDs 
from felons over misdemeanants and incarcerated felons over non-
incarcerated felons does not resonate as well as it could. Although one 
might criticize the 180-day residency requirement as arbitrary even 
without standing in the shoes of Patrick Church and the Brodigans, the 
indiscriminate felon incarceration standard rests on particularly shaky 
grounds. First, even if one were to admit that the average misdemeanant 
has committed a less heinous crime, there is no empirical evidence—at 
least none to which the courts have pointed—to suggest that felons 
outside of prison pose less risk to society than their incarcerated 
counterparts. Second, the goal of compensating crime victims, which the 
court in Anthony held valid, is distinct from defraying the costs of 
administering state prisons. Putting aside the court’s discussion of 
restitution, if the controlling rationale has become compensating victims 
instead of the penal system, then withholding PFDs to the imprisoned 
makes little sense. The court cannot guarantee that the withheld funds 
will reach the intended beneficiary under a victims’ rights theory. At 
least if the goal were to “pay into” the prison system, one could be sure 
that the PFD money either remains in the state’s hands or offsets the tax 
bill of the average citizen through higher PFD check amounts. 
III. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN JUDICIAL DECISIONS AND 
POLITICAL MEMBERSHIP 
The decisions reviewed in Part II uniformly indicate that individual 
challenges to the PFD’s enacting statutory text and associated 
 
 51.  Such legal reasoning mirrors strategies pursued unsuccessfully by 
released felons subject to sexual offender registration and notification programs. 
See Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84 (2003). 
 52.  Hertz v. Storer, 943 P.2d 725, 726 (Alaska 1997) (citing State v. Anthony, 
816 P.2d 1377 (Alaska 1991)). 
 53.  Id. 
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regulations find little favor with the Alaska Supreme Court. One 
account explaining this outcome could be the high level of judicial 
deference to legislative and administrative bodies. Another could 
involve more fundamentally the fact that claimants believe themselves 
(genuinely or not) to be situated at the margins of eligibility and seek 
declaratory relief that pushes them into the category of valid PFD 
recipients. With enough residents believing that they qualify after a 
Department of Revenue denial of payment, the odds surely increase that 
some proportion of these suits will be frivolous. 
These cases express something deeper about Alaska’s political 
fabric. Some observers might surmise, as the Anthony court so clearly 
expressed,54 that the PFD is a vestige of economic citizenship rather than 
a badge of political inclusion. Yet this view loses force in any jurisdiction 
that relies so deeply on natural resources for economic subsistence and, 
further, where the population identifies itself with the land as Alaskans 
do. Although economic rights usually are considered subsets within 
larger bundles,55 the fiscal blends almost completely with the political 
under the PFD system. The residency, citizenship, and incarceration 
cases to varying degrees reflect the combined views of the legislature 
and the bench about who “counts” as a full member of the state by tying 
legal status to economic benefits. To be sure, many state and federal 
transfers also depend on satisfying legal requirements (e.g., Medicaid 
receipts and immigration status). But the PFD transfer symbolizes 
something much more fundamental. Given the history of the program 
and the political branches’ desire to preserve the state’s natural 
resources for current and future generations, the individual’s stake in 
the physical commons parallels her stake in the political unit. 
Furthermore, the affirmative orientation of the PFD system 
supports a conception of judicial and administrative eligibility 
determinations as reaching the core of political membership. 
“Affirmative” rights express a positive grant by the government to the 
advantage of the recipient.56 A narrower definition might also require 
that the beneficiary take some prescribed action before the transfer 
 
 54.  Anthony, 810 P.2d at 162 (“An individual’s interest in a permanent fund 
dividend, like other economic interests, is entitled to minimum scrutiny.”). 
 55.  See, e.g., Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM. 
ECON. REV. 347 (1967); J.E. Penner, The “Bundle of Rights” Picture of Property, 43 
UCLA L. REV. 711 (1996). 
 56.  See, e.g., Laurence H. Tribe, Unraveling National League of Cities: The 
New Federalism and Affirmative Rights to Essential Government Services, 90 HARV. L. 
REV. 1065, 1066 (1977) (predicting the emergence of a doctrine “that 
recognizes . . . rights to decent levels of affirmative governmental protection in 
meeting the basic human needs of physical survival and security, health and 
housing, employment and education”). 
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accrues, as is the case for PFD recipients. Because receipt depends on an 
individual affirmatively applying for the dividend, the program remains 
universal—in accord with the constitutional directive—but forces 
Alaskans to petition for their share of the oil revenue stream. This 
characteristic signals deeper normative judgments about who should 
receive the pro rata share of natural resource wealth, not just how much a 
qualifying beneficiary receives. The reason is that the government asks 
residents to step forward and claim their shares. Just as appearing in the 
voting booth to cast a ballot symbolizes civic participation across the 
country, so too does filing personal applications for the PFD in Alaska. 
Since the state compels Alaskans to take affirmative action, denied 
dividends potentially represent a more deeply negative judgment about 
one’s place in the political order. “Outsiders” will be turned away, while 
“insiders” will collect their checks. Such border policing admittedly 
occurs through a very simple mechanism, the modest annual PFD sum. 
As a result, one might scoff at this attempt to equate a bureaucratic 
decision with one’s fundamental political identity. But when the benefit 
embodies the sort of intergenerational bequest that the PFD does, 
particularly when secured by the good fortune of plentiful natural 
resources (rather than taxes on wealth, income, or consumption), its 
availability partially defines the set of full participants in the society. 
CONCLUSION 
The Alaska PFD serves as a beacon for political economists seeking 
to implement asset-based welfare programs in other parts of the United 
States and around the world. Despite close to three decades of 
unmitigated achievement, the PFD is not without controversy within the 
state’s borders. Various claims to dividend shares have been rejected by 
the Department of Revenue and the state’s highest court because the 
claimants have not met the legal definition of qualified recipients. The 
responses from Alaska residents, also of varying probative value, 
present real disputes over constitutional and statutory interpretation. 
Consequently, the endgame is not just the final judgment in a particular 
litigation matter. The court’s discussions, grappling as they have with 
deference to administrative agencies, reasonableness, and the relative 
contributions (or free-riding) of potential beneficiaries, engage questions 
of profound legal importance. And those legal questions blend often 
seamlessly with political ones, namely who shares fully in civil society. 
No evidence currently implies forthcoming amendments to the PFD 
statute that would expand the eligibility provisions, and thus the 
boundaries of political inclusion, beyond their current location. 
However, should future innovations in APF administration arise, from 
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recalculating the dividend amount to organizing larger public 
investment projects, such developments will affirm whatever vision that 
generation of Alaskans holds for the composition of its political 
community. 
 
